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This dissertation consists of two essays that examine the role of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) in finance. In the first essay, we examine the bondholder wealth effects of socially 
responsible firms. Using an extensive U.S sample from 2006 to 2016 and two methodologies – 
corporate yield spreads and bond credit ratings – we provide evidence that proactive environmental 
and social practices are reflected in the price of corporate bonds. Furthermore, we examine the 
impact of managerial ownership on the relationship between CSR and bondholder wealth effects.  
We postulate that higher equity ownership induces managers to take on more firm risk in the 
interest of shareholders, thereby increasing the company’s default risk. Empirical findings reveal 
that CSR plays a significant role in reducing the risk premium of corporate bonds and in assessing 
the credit quality of specific bond issues and that managerial ownership attenuates the negative 
relation between CSR and bondholder wealth. Results are robust to various controls for firm and 
bond specific factors, alternative model specifications, and industry membership.  
The second essay identifies the factors that motivate organizations to invest in corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). Using a comprehensive sample of publicly traded, non-financial, U.S. 
domiciled firms for the period between 2006-2016, we identify and examine several firm and CEO 
characteristics that potentially explain the extent of firms’ devotion to corporate social 
investments. We find evidence that advertising intensive firms and financially stable firms are 
more likely to engage in socially responsible activities, while risker firms demonstrate lower levels 
of CSR. Furthermore, we address the question of whether certain types of CEOs are more likely 
to invest in CSR by exploring the role of CEO attributes. Empirical results indicate that female 
CEOs are more intrinsically motivated to undertake long-term investments in socially responsible 
initiatives pertaining to environmental concerns and diversity issues. We also find support that the 
CEO compensation structure is more related to the employee relations and environmental concerns 
dimensions. 
 




 CHAPTER 1: CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVES AND THE 
CORPORATE BOND MARKET 
I. Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) makes a connection between ethics and capitalism 
by aligning company social and environmental initiatives with business objectives and values to 
address the broader purpose of the firm.  CSR is the commitment of business to take actions that 
are intended to have a positive social or environmental impact on society without compromising 
economic performance. Some of the most common examples of CSR practices include reducing 
the company’s carbon footprint to mitigate climate change, improving labor policies and 
promoting fair trade, and participating in philanthropy and volunteer efforts within the community. 
The challenge that many corporations face is finding the right balance between CSR activities 
geared to the long-term benefits of stakeholders and short-term economic performance that 
complies with shareholder objectives. 
 Under the shareholder primacy, firms pursue only one objective, namely that of profit 
maximization (Jensen, 2001). This theory, which was advanced by economist Milton Friedman 
(1970) in his famous New York Times article, claims that shareholder interests should be 
prioritized over all other corporate stakeholders. A consideration of social or environmental issues 
would only produce unnecessary costs that would conflict with the objective of maximizing 
shareholder value. This includes the value of the equity as well as the market values of all other 
financial claims including debt, preferred stock, and warrants (Jensen, 2002).  As the integration 
of corporate social responsibility in business practice becomes more prevalent nowadays, 
corporations are increasingly deviating from this neo-classical perspective. According to the latest 
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UN Global Compact – Accenture CEO study (2019), nearly all (99%) of the participant CEOs of 
the world’s largest companies consider CSR an important factor for corporate sustainability and 
future financial success1. 
Academic research in this trending area has also advanced, paralleling market 
development. A substantial part of the extant literature focuses on whether a company’s socially 
responsible behavior enhances firm value (Malik, 2015). Studies that address this issue focus on 
the relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance 
(CFP). Many of the studies that investigate this relationship view CSP as being potentially value 
creating or value destroying. A relatively small number of academic papers discuss the value-
protective attributes of CSR in the form of reduced financial risks. We, hence, contribute to the 
emerging literature that explores the link between capital markets and socially responsible 
corporations and recognize CSR as a tool for implementing cost and risk reductions. 
This paper contributes to the literature on corporate finance, particularly the literature on 
corporate financing and investment decisions and the literature on corporate social responsibility.  
We empirically test whether engaging in a certain level of environmental and social initiatives 
reduces the firm’s exposure to capital market risks, particularly the risks pertaining to corporate 
bonds. Using pooled OLS estimation, we analyze the impact of CSR on the cost of public debt 
financing for U.S. firms over the period of 2006-2016. We proxy for the cost of debt using bond 
yield spreads and test and confirm the robustness of the results by employing bond ratings as an 
alternative measure of the cost of debt. 
 




Despite the large amount of attention around this evolving corporate practice, the 
normative implications of research on corporate social responsibility are ambiguous. The 
fundamental question that remains unanswered is whether CSR is consistent with the wealth-
maximizing interests of investors. Studies aimed at assessing the capital market benefits of CSR 
are mostly conducted from the perspective of the stock market (Menz, 2010). In this paper, we 
focus our analysis on the debt market, which is relatively understudied in the CSR literature and 
highly significant for the external financing of corporations. We argue that since the U.S. debt 
market is very large and dynamic and bonds are an important asset class, bond investors can have 
the quantitative potential as well as the incentive to pressure companies to exercise responsible 
behavior. Motivated by this, we investigate whether a firm’s engagement in CSR is viewed 
favorably by bondholders. An important research question that we seek to answer is whether 
corporate environmental and social performance is priced into corporate bonds. 
The relationship between CSR engagement and financial performance is typically affected 
by mediating variables, which are not always conscientiously considered by researchers (Peloza 
and Shang, 2011). We follow (Cooper and Uzun, 2015) and fill this gap in the literature by 
including managerial ownership as a moderating factor in our analysis of CSR and credit risk. This 
is executed to assess whether the effect of corporate social performance on cost of debt varies with 
the level of managerial ownership. We find evidence that firms characterized by higher levels of 
corporate social performance sustain lower borrowing costs in the bond market and that higher 
managerial ownership reduces the impact of CSR on the cost of debt. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We first provide the theoretical rationale and 
develop the hypotheses. We then describe the data, methodology, and empirical model used to test 
the hypotheses. We next present the results of the analysis and determine whether the findings 
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support our hypotheses. Lastly, we conclude by considering the implications of our findings for 
both academics and practicing managers. 
II. Related literature and hypotheses development 
A. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
Whether and how corporate social responsibility affects firm value is a contentious topic. There 
is no consensus on whether CSR improves shareholder benefits or wastes firm resources. However, 
socially responsible firms are generally considered to be less risky (Ferrell et al., 2016). This 
provides corporations an incentive to integrate social and environmental issues in their business 
activities and in their interactions with various stakeholder groups. A substantial part of the CSR 
empirical literature is largely focused on the ex post effects of CSR. These studies focus on 
measuring shareholder reactions to CSR as captured by abnormal stock returns (Deng et al., 2013; 
Dimson et al., 2015; Dutordoir et al., 2018) or on the financial consequences of CSR spending 
(Porter and Kramer,2002; Brammer and Millington, 2005; Lin et al., 2009; Griffin & Mahon, 1997; 
Harrison & Freeman, 1999; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Margolis et al., 2009;Cheng et al., 2014). 
 Dimson et al. (2015) examine shareholder reactions to CSR as proxied by abnormal stock 
returns. They use a private dataset to analyze 2,152 CSR engagements by a single investment firm 
with U.S. target companies. They find that successful engagements experience positive abnormal 
returns, while unsuccessful engagements generate zero abnormal returns. Deng et al. (2013) also 
examine shareholder reactions to CSR by analyzing a large sample of mergers in the US. They 
study the impact of CSR on acquiring firms’ shareholders and find evidence that, in contrast to 
low CSR acquirers, high CSR acquirers realize higher merger announcement returns. Similarly, 
Dutordoir et al. (2018) investigate whether CSR creates shareholder value for seasoned equity 
issuers. They conduct an event study to analyze the impact of CSR on the stock price reaction to 
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SEO announcements and find that issuers with relatively high CSR scores have less negative stock 
price reactions to their SEOs.  
One of the most controversial topics in CSR literature is the relation between CSR and firm 
performance (Malik, 2015). Several empirical studies in the extant literature demonstrate that CSR 
and firm performance are positively associated (Porter and Kramer,2002; Brammer and 
Millington, 2005; Lin et al., 2009). Other papers show a negative relation or no association 
between CSR and company financial performance (Griffin & Mahon, 1997; Harrison & Freeman, 
1999; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). Margolis et al. (2009) conduct a meta-analysis and conclude 
that the overall relation between CSR and firm performance is positive.  
Following these studies, Cheng et al. (2014) extend the literature by investigating whether 
differences in CSR ratings affect the firm’s ability to access finance in capital markets. They 
conclude that high CSR firms are less affected by capital restrictions. They attribute this conclusion 
to the idea that stronger firm commitment to CSR builds up mutual trust with stakeholders and 
establishes a long-term relation.  
B. Cost of debt 
Credit risk assumes that if there is a higher level of perceived default risk, investors demand a 
higher rate of interest for their capital or they may forgo the investment. Therefore, higher levels 
of credit risk are associated with higher borrowing costs. Cost of debt refers to the company’s cost 
of raising funds through debt financing. Yield spread is a measure of borrowing costs that can be 
used to infer credit risk levels based on assessments by market participants. The credit spread of a 
corporate bond represents a compensation for the risks incurred by the investor.  
There are several proxies for cost of debt in the literature; common measures used among 
scholars include yield spread (Huang and Huang, 2012), yield to maturity (Khurana and Raman, 
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2003), and credit ratings on new bond issues (Sengupta, 1998; Shi, 2003). Yield spread is the most 
common measure used to capture the risk premium that bond issuers pay to bond investors to raise 
funds.  In comparison to yield spreads, yield to maturity is not adjusted for general economic 
conditions and credit ratings have a discontinuous nature that results in a rough distribution of 
credit risk across borrowers (Wilson and Fabozzi, 1990). In this paper, we use yield spread as our 
main measure of cost of debt. We also employ bond credit ratings in sensitivity analyses to validate 
our results. 
C. Link between CSR and cost of debt 
Generally, there are two different views that describe the relationship between CSR ratings 
and borrowing costs (Schröder, 2014). The first view argues that firms with high CSR ratings 
experience better long-term financial performance and a lower susceptibility to extreme risk. As a 
result, this leads to the company enduring lower borrowing costs.  The opposing view claims that 
CSR is detrimental to firm value as higher costs and lower profitability, caused by a firm’s 
sustainability efforts, increases relative borrowing costs. The first view is in line with Milton 
Friedman’s (1970) shareholder theory; the opposing view supports Edward Freeman’s (1984) 
stakeholder theory.  
Goss and Roberts (2011) examine the impact of corporate social responsibility on the cost of 
bank loans for 1,265 U.S. firms between 1991 and 2006. They find that companies with a below-
average CSR rating pay slightly higher borrowing costs on their bank debt, namely 7-18 basis 
points higher. Kim et al. (2014) expand the geographic coverage of Goss and Robert’s (2011) 
study and analyze the loan spreads of 513 firms in 19 different countries for the period 2003-2007. 
This study also finds evidence that the loan spread decreases as the borrowers’ CSR rating 
improves. Oikonomou et al. (2014) examine the relationship between CSR and cost of debt capital 
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for U.S. firms. Contrary to Goss and Roberts (2014) and Kim et al. (2013) who analyze the cost 
of loans, Oikonomou et al. (2014), Ge and Liu (2015), and Cooper and Uzun (2015) analyze the 
costs of corporate bonds. They find that a higher CSR rating reduces the yield difference between 
corporate bonds and Treasury bonds. We follow these studies to examine the impact of CSR on 
the spreads and credit ratings of corporate bonds. The manner in which bondholders view CSR is 
an important topic because debt is the dominant source of capital structure and crucial for firms’ 
activities. To test the relevance of CSR for bond investors, we use two variables that capture 
aspects of the corporate cost of debt and credit risk: yield spreads and credit ratings. We also 
examine the moderating effect of ownership on the relationship between CSR and cost of debt.  
D. Hypotheses development 
Superior corporate social performance can mitigate financial risk. The validity of this assertion 
can be tested in the framework of both equity and debt markets alike. We focus our analysis on 
the debt market and use two methodologies – corporate yield spreads and bond credit ratings – to 
estimate firms’ ex ante cost of debt. We argue that companies with better CSR performance scores 
can raise capital in the corporate bond market more cheaply.  
The level of financial risk that a firm is exposed to can have a profound effect on its cost of 
capital. We hypothesize that by effectively aligning environmental and social actions with 
corporate goals, firms can use corporate social responsibility as a strategic tool to mitigate business 
risk, and thus maximize shareholder value. Findings from this study can have significant 
implications for investors, asset managers, as well as corporate managers. Investors may reduce 
their level of exposed credit risk by investing in more stable corporations that offer lower costs of 
debt and higher credit quality issues. Asset managers may also benefit from lower default risk by 
choosing socially responsible companies to lend to during economic crises when uncertainty is 
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high.  Corporate managers may adopt a socially responsible business mentality to attract funds 
from financial markets at a lower cost.  
Bondholders generally asses the default risk of a company through yield spreads and credit 
ratings. Based on these methodologies, we develop the following two hypotheses:  
H1: On average, firms with better CSR ratings issue lower risk premium bonds. 
H2: On average, firm with better CSR ratings issue higher quality rating bonds. 
III. Research design 
First, we describe the data sources used to build our final data set. We then explain how the 
sample was constructed and describe the methodology used to test the empirical model. 
A. Data Sources 
We construct our sample using four databases: (1) MSCI KLD STATS Database, (2) Mergent 
Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD), (3) Compustat North America Database, and (4) 
ExecuComp Database. To construct the independent variable, we gather data from MSCI KLD 
STATS database. This measure is based on the company’s multidimensional, stakeholder-defined 
assessment of its involvement in CSR activity. MSCI KLD STATS is an annual data set of positive 
and negative environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance indicators applied to a 
universe of publicly traded companies. MSCI is an independent research center that uses both 
internal and external sources to conduct unbiased year-by-year assessments of the corporate social 
performance. The database is one of the longest continuous ESG data time series available and is 
among one of the most widely used tools in CSR research (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Ghoul et al., 
2011; Goss and Roberts, 2011). Firms are evaluated on strengths and concerns in seven different 
qualitative areas including environmental issues, community relations, employee relations, 
diversity issues, product safety and quality, corporate governance, and human rights. Within a 
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given qualitative area, MSCI provides a set of indicators for each strength and concern activity. 
Each category is rated following a binary scheme in that an indicator is given a score of “1” if a 
particular indicator is present in the firm or a score of “0” if otherwise. 
We collect issuer yield spreads, credit ratings, and bond characteristics from Mergent Fixed 
Income Securities database (FISD). Mergent FISD is a comprehensive database of publicly offered 
U.S. bonds that includes total proceeds raised as well as other characteristics such as credit quality, 
yield to maturity, coupon rate, and maturity date. Following the industry convention and prior 
literature, we consider credit ratings of AAA through BBB- (or equivalent) as investment grade 
and BB+ through C (or equivalent) as below-investment (also called noninvestment or speculative) 
grade. We use annual fundamentals data from Compustat North America to control for firm-level 
characteristics and collect managerial ownership information from ExecuComp. 
B. Sample Construction 
Our final sample contains annual snapshots of environmental and social information on U.S. 
public firms from 2006 to 2016. The sample includes financial information on the corporate bonds 
that were issued by these firms as well as financial information on the bond issuers themselves. In 
constructing the CSR measure, we focus on the qualitative business issues that explicitly affect 
stakeholder groups (see Figure 1 in Appendix) as they are considered to have an impact on the 
social posture, profile, and activities of firms: i) Environmental issues, ii) Community relations, 
iii) Employee relations, iv) Diversity issues, and v) Product safety and quality (Hillman and Keim, 
2001). 
 We merge the CSR data with corporate bond data from the Mergent FISD database. We also 
incorporate financial information and executive ownership information on the corporate bonds that 
were issued by the firms included in the sample, using Compustat and Execucomp, respectively. 
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In line with the conventional wisdom, we exclude financial (SIC codes 6000-6799) and utility (SIC 
codes 4000-4999) firms from the sample since these industries are highly regulated and tend to 
have different debt financing characteristics than industrial firms (Jiang, 2008; Khurana and 
Raman, 2003). Proceeding, we restrict the sample to bond issues with a fixed rate (Bessembinder 
et al., 2009; Oikonomou et al., 2014; Ge and Liu , 2014)). For firms with multiple bond issues 
during a fiscal year, we follow Cooper and Uzun (2015) and keep only the bond issue with the 
largest offering amount to have only one issue per firm-year. Furthermore, we eliminate defaults 
and bond issues that lack environmental, social, or firm-level data. Following this elimination 
process, our final sample consists of a total of 1,699 firm-year observations spanning the years 
2006 to 2016. 
C. Methodology 
The underlying premise of this research is to explore corporate social responsibility as a 
determinant of fixed-income securities. Three different panel econometric methods are in principle 
available for the empirical analysis (pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects, and random 
effects model). Using pooled OLS, we regress cost of debt, as proxied by the logarithm of the bond 
spread, against corporate social responsibility and managerial ownership. Various explanatory 
variables are added to the empirical model to control for firm-specific and bond-specific 
characteristics.  We lag firm-level control variables in order to reduce potential endogeneity issues. 
Furthermore, we estimate robust standard errors (White, 1980) and control for industry fixed 
effects and year fixed effects. Specifically, our base model is estimated using the following 
equation: 
     LnSpreadit = α + β1*CSRit + γ'Xit-1 + δ'Zit + IFEit + YFEt + εit      (1) 
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where LnSpreadijt denotes the yield spread of firm i during year t; CSRit  represents firm i’s  CSR 
performance index measured at time t; X it-1   is a (Kx1) vector of the  firm-level controls measured 
at time t-1 and Zit is a (Lx1) vector of bond-level controls measured at time t. 
a. Dependent Variables 
The first dependent variable, the yield spread, is a direct proxy for cost of debt. Yield spread 
is commonly used in the literature to capture the risk premium that bond issuers pay to bond 
investors to raise funds and is therefore considered a direct measure of the firm’s incremental cost 
of public debt (Elton et al., 2001). A bond’s yield relative to the yield of its benchmark is called a 
spread. The spread is used both as a pricing mechanism and as a relative value comparison between 
bonds and can be used to infer credit risk levels. In line with the extant literature, we calculate 
yield spread as the difference between the yield of the corporate bond minus the yield of the 
Treasury bond with comparable maturity. Missing values are computed as the difference between 
the offering yield and the corresponding treasury yield having the same maturity (contained in the 
Federal Reserve H-15 release for constant maturities.). We then take the logarithm to adjust for 
positive skewness in the yield spread distribution, as it is non-negative by definition and 
estimation.  
As a robustness check, we employ a second dependent variable. We use bond ratings assigned 
by Standard & Poor’s to assess the risk quality of the corporate bond. Bond rating is an indicator 
of the credit risk associated with a company; hence, we use it as an alternative measure of the cost 
of debt  Following a similar methodology as proposed by Becker and Milbourn (2011), we convert 
bond-level letter credit ratings to numerical ratings. Figure 1.2 in the appendix describes the credit 
rating categories and the corresponding numerical scale used to construct the bond credit rating 
variable. As with yield spread, bond rating can also be used to infer credit risk levels. The lower 
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the rating (numerical value) or higher the letter grade, the less likely a company is to default in 
debt payments. Credit ratings of AAA through BBB- are investment grade and BB+ through C are 
below-investment (also called non-investment or speculative) grade. We drop firms assigned ‘D’ 
and ‘SD’ from the sample because these ratings are assigned to firms currently in default on their 
financial obligations. We find that 65% of the corporate bonds in our sample are investment-grade 
bonds. 
b. Independent Variables 
We estimate our empirical model using three approaches to measuring socially responsible 
practices. Firm-level CSR performance indices are constructed from multiple indicators within 
five of KLD’s qualitative issue areas: environmental issues, community relations, employee 
relations, diversity issues, and product safety and quality. Following Servaes and Tamayo (2013), 
we first add the scores of the indicators that compose each dimension of positive or negative 
corporate actions and scale each sum by dividing by the number of relevant indicators.  
The MSCI KLD database provides data on three major areas: Environmental, Social, and 
Governance (ESG). We exclude indicators from the governance dimension since they are 
irrelevant or indirectly relevant to stakeholder interests.  Abeysekera and Fernando (2020) claim 
that the financial consequences of environmental policies of firms are considerably larger than 
other socially relevant corporate policies. Hence, we construct three distinct CSR measures based 
on the group in which the indicators correspond. The environmental CSR index is measured as the 
difference between the scaled strengths and scaled concerns, we previously constructed, of the 
environmental issue-area. Similarly, the social CSR index is constructed by taking the sum of the 
differences between the scaled strengths and scaled concerns of the issue-areas that compose the 
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social dimension: community, employee, diversity, and product. Lastly, we construct the aggregate 
CSR index by taking the sum of the environmental CSR index and the social CSR index. Following 
Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014), we standardize our CSR indices to have a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one in order to simplify the interpretation of the regression coefficients. 
Given the impact of managerial ownership on the cost of debt (Shuto and Kitagawa, 2011), 
we extend the literature by examining the moderating role of managerial ownership on the 
relationship between CSR and cost of debt. Ortiz-Molina (2006), among others, examine the 
relation between managerial ownership and borrowing costs and provide evidence of a positive 
relation.  As a proxy for how managerial ownership could impact corporate bond spreads, we look 
at the interaction between the CSR index and the number of the firm's shares held by the CEO as 
a percentage of total shares outstanding. We examine whether managerial ownership plays a role 
in increasing or decreasing the sensitivity of CSR effects and postulate that the risk-increasing 
impact of managerial stock ownership from the bondholders’ perspective is likely to 
counterbalance the risk-reducing impact of CSR on bond yields.  
c. Control Variables 
In line with the prevalent research in the field of credit risk, ratings, and bond pricing 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Lee and Faff, 2009; Oikonomou et al., 2014), we utilize a series of 
control variables that account for bond-specific and firm-specific factors.  
Firm-level controls include firm size, profitability, leverage, financial strength, and interest 
coverage. We measure firm size as the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets. Larger firms 
tend to face lower business and financial risks; hence, they have a lower default risk (Dang et al., 
2018). We expect firm size to be negatively related to our cost of debt measure. Profitability is 
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proxied by the firm’s ROA, which measures the ability of a firm to generate profit. We calculate 
it as the ratio of the firm’s earnings before extraordinary items divided by its total assets. A higher 
value implies higher profitability and ability to cover debt obligations. Therefore, we expect ROA 
to be negatively related to cost of debt. Leverage is proxied by the firm’s debt ratio and is defined 
as the ratio of the firm’s total debt to its total assets. A firm that accumulates more debt has a higher 
leverage ratio. A higher value indicates higher default risk. Therefore, we expect debt ratio to be 
positively related to cost of debt. Following Ge and Liu (2014), we also control for financial 
strength by including Altman’s (1968) z-score, which is based on five financial ratios: working 
capital to total assets, retained earnings to total assets, earnings before interest and taxes to total 
assets, market value of equity to total liabilities, and sales to total assets. Altman’s z-score is used 
to assess the bankruptcy risk of a company. A higher value indicates a lower probability of 
bankruptcy. Therefore, we expect an inverse relation between z-score and cost of debt. We also 
control for interest coverage, which is the ratio of the firm’s earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) divided by its total interest expense. A higher interest coverage ratio is associated with 
lower default risk; hence, we expect interest coverage ratio to be negatively related to cost of debt. 
The bond-level control variables that we account for include issue size, maturity, modified 
duration, and investment grade.  Issue size represents the size of the bond issue. We estimate it as 
the natural logarithm of the size of the bond issue (in millions of dollars). Bond maturity is defined 
as the natural logarithm of the number of years until the bond matures. Bonds with longer 
maturities tend to be associated with greater risk due to the greater degree of unpredictability in 
forecasting the firms’ solvency in the distant future. Therefore, we expect a positive association 
between bond maturity and cost of debt. The bond duration, measured in years, is used to control 
for differences in maturity and coupon rates. We include it in the empirical model to control for 
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the bond’s interest rate risk. We calculate it as the present value of a bond’s cash flows, weighted 
by the length of time to receipt and divided by the bond’s current market value. We expect duration 
to be negatively related to yield spread.  
Lastly, we include Fama and French’s 30 industry indicators and year indicators to further 
control for potential differences in issuer and issue features across industries and over time, 
respectively (Fama and French, 1997).  
IV. Results 
C. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1.1 presents the key descriptive statistics for the main variables in our analyses. The 
bond-level variables included in this table are yield spread (in percentage), bond rating score, 
maturity (in years), modified duration (in years), and issue size (in millions of dollars). Yield 
spreads have a mean value of approximately 2.64%, which is equivalent to 264 basis points. The 
median credit rating is 9, which indicates that more than half of bond issues are investment grade. 
The average bond has a maturity of 11.09 years and duration of 7.56 years.  
We also provide descriptive statistics for several firm-level variables including the CSR 
measures, managerial ownership, firm size, return on assets, leverage, z-score, and interest 
coverage ratio. The average scores for the three CSR performance proxies – environmental CSR, 
social CSR, and aggregate CSR – are 0.062, -.04, 0.023, respectively. These averages imply that 
the firms in our sample have higher environmental performance scores than social performance 
scores. As for managerial ownership, a firm’s CEO holds 1.26% of the firm’s shares, on average. 
The average firm in our sample has total assets of approximately $26.96 billion. The average 
ROA is 5.1%. and the average leverage ratio is 33.5%.  
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Table 1.1. Summary statistics of key variables 
     N   Mean   St.Dev   p25   Median   p75 
Bond-level variables       
 Yield spread (%) 1699 2.644 1.926 1.28 2 3.54 
 Rating score assigned 1699 9.53 3.496 7 9 12 
 Maturity (in years) 1699 11.085 7.223 8 10 10 
 Duration (in years) 1699 7.558 3.071 5.603 7.245 8.234 
 Issue size (in millions) 1699 682000 656000 300000 500000 800000 
       
Firm-level variables       
 Environmental CSR score 1699 .062 .239 0 0 .167 
 Social CSR score  1699 -.04 .522 -.3 0 .2 
 Aggregate CSR score 1699 .023 .648 -.383 0 .367 
 CEO ownership (%) 1673 1.256 4.174 .112 .301 .923 
 Firm size (in millions) 1699 26961.26 59032.23 4098.1 8914.169 25614 
 Return on assets (ROA) 1699 .051 .083 .027 .056 .087 
 Leverage 1698 .335 .161 .221 .309 .425 
 Z-score 1614 2.154 1.239 1.457 2.155 2.791 
 Interest coverage ratio 1678 12.028 29.18 3.176 6.715 12.431 
 
Table 1.2 provides statistics on average yield spreads by year. Generally, corporate bond 
spreads tend to widen during economic recessions since there is a higher likelihood of the 
company defaulting on its debt obligations during a time of economic contraction.  This table 
reveals  that in 2008 and 2009 firms had the highest average yield spreads. 
Table 1.2. Yield spreads by year 
  year    N   mean   sd   min   max 
 2006 91 162.467 79.529 39 416 
 2007 116 195.566 117.786 12.5 886 
 2008 102 311.555 173.447 35 1034 
 2009 200 424.797 275.387 67 1654 
 2010 195 286.157 195.22 22 928 
 2011 146 238.034 176.596 33 1056 
 2012 223 277.463 203.722 3.8 981 
 2013 194 246.232 165.045 12 1008 
 2014 182 203.225 134.579 22.311 639 
 2015 169 232.211 140.038 28.537 881 
 2016 81 230.323 142.622 51.5 625 
Total 1699 264.4448 192.6122 3.8 1654 
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Table 1.3 presents a Pearson correlation matrix of the main variables included in our 
analyses. This table illustrates that multicollinearity is not an issue in our sample. Consistent with 
our predictions, yield spread and rating score are negatively correlated with CSR.  Managerial 
ownership is positively related to bonds spreads and ratings. Overall, most coefficients on the 
control variables are statistically significant and display the expected signs with the measures of 
cost of debt.  Firm size, ROA, z-score, and interest coverage are all negatively correlated with 
yield spread and rating score. Also consistent with our predictions, we find leverage is positively 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B. Empirical results 
This section reports key results of the empirical analysis. Table 1.4 illustrates the effects of 
corporate social responsibility on bond yield spreads. We examine this effect using our three 
proxies for CSR – environmental CSR, social CSR, and aggregate CSR. We find that the 
coefficient of aggregate CSR and environmental CSR are negative and significant at the 10% level 
and 1% level, respectively. The coefficient of social CSR is negative but not statistically 
significant. We also interact managerial ownership with our three measures of CSR. We find that 
as managerial ownership increases, the risk-reducing effect of CSR on cost of debt diminishes. 
This is illustrated by the significantly positive relation between the interaction variable and yield 
spreads.   Furthermore, this table reveals that the environmental dimension has a greater impact in 
reducing the risk premia associated with corporate bonds.  
Table 1.4. The effect of CSR on bond yield spreads 
Variables Prediction (1) (2) (3) 
DV: Yield Spread DV: Yield Spread DV: Yield Spread 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
Aggregate CSR − -0.024 -1.81*     
Environmental 
CSR 
−   -0.052 -3.59***   
Social CSR −     -0.008 -0.67 
Ownership + 0.003 1.52 0.007 2.23** 0.002 1.09 
Aggregate CSR* 
Ownership 
 0.010 2.79***     
Environmental 
CSR* Ownership 
   0.022 2.40***   
Social CSR* 
Ownership 
     0.006 2.22** 
Firm size − -0.171 -8.03*** -0.166 -7.84*** -0.172 -8.08*** 
ROA − -0.951 -3.76*** -0.922 -3.67*** -0.980 -3.86*** 
Leverage +     -0.003      -0.03 -0.012 -0.12 -0.007 -9.07 
Z-Score − -0.088 -3.06*** -0.088 -3.09*** -0.087 -3.04*** 
Interest coverage − -0.001 -2.45*** -0.001 -2.46*** -0.001 -2.45*** 
Issue size  0.108 3.11*** 0.109 3.13*** 0.108 3.09*** 
Maturity + 1.553 11.92*** 1.541 11.91*** 1.558 11.94*** 
Duration − -0.229 -10.16*** -0.228 -10.16*** -0.230 -10.18*** 
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Investment grade − -0.483 -9.74*** -0.483 -9.78*** -0.486 -9.79*** 
Year indicators  YES YES YES 
Industry indicators  YES YES YES 
No. of observation  1,028 1,028 1,028 
Adjusted R-
squared 
 0.712 0.714 0.711 
 
To validate our findings from Table 1.4, we regress CSR against our alternative measure 
of cost of debt. Table 1.5 illustrates the effects of corporate social responsibility on bond credit 
ratings. Once again, we use OLS regressions to examine the relationship between CSR and cost of 
debt financing.  We find that the coefficient of aggregate CSR, environmental CSR, and social 
CSR are negative and significant at the 1% level, 1% level, and 5% level, respectively. Consistent 
with Table 1.4, we find that the environmental dimension has the greatest impact in mitigating 
risk.  
Table 1.5. The effect of CSR on bond ratings 
Variables Predictio
n 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
DV: Bond Rating  DV: Bond Rating  DV: Bond Rating 
Coefficient z-value  Coefficient z-value  Coefficient z-value 
Aggregate CSR − -0.230 -2.87***       
Environmental CSR −    -0.213 -2.97***    
Social CSR −       -0.171 -2.27** 
Ownership + 0.048     3.90***  0.056 3.15***  0.046 3.88*** 
Aggregate CSR* 
Ownership 
 0.017 0.86      
Environmental 
CSR* Ownership 
    0.048 0.87    
Social CSR* 
Ownership 
       0.010 0.55 
Firm size −     -1.445 -15.48***  -1.438 -15.23***  -1.454 -15.60*** 
ROA − -11.507 -5.28***  -11.555 -5.39***  -11.641 -5.33*** 
Leverage +          1.774      
2.84*** 
 1.716 2.77***  1.761 2.81*** 
Z-Score − -1.417 -6.60***  -1.406 -6.67***  -1.415 -6.54 *** 
Interest coverage − -0.012 -1.70*  -0.013 -1.69*  -0.012 -1.69* 
Issue size  0.308 2.16**  0.303 2.09**  0.302 2.12** 
Maturity + 4.201 8.20***  4.200 8.21***  4.232 8.27*** 
Duration − -0.753 -8.70***  -0.756 -8.77***  -0.758 -8.74*** 
Year indicators  YES        YES  YES 
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Industry indicators  YES        YES  YES 
No. of observation  1,028        1,028  1,028 
Pseudo R-squared  0.259        0.259  0.258 
 
Next, we re-estimate all regressions on separate sub-samples based on high versus low 
levels of CSR, high versus low z-score firms, and investment grade versus non-investment grade 
bonds. According to Table 1.6, the positive effect of CSR is more pronounced in the sub-sample 
of firms with high levels of CSR and high z-scores. CSR has an impact on yield spreads for high 
CSR firms, but has no effect on low CSR firms. Likewise, CSR impacts yield spreads for less 
financially distressed firms, but has a lower effect on firms with more financial constraints. 
Furthermore, Ge and Liu (2015) find that CSR has no impact on yield spreads for highly 
speculative-grade bonds. Contrary to their findings, we provide evidence that CSR hinders non-
investment bonds as the association between CSR performance and cost of debt is positive. 
Table 1.6. The effect of aggregate CSR on bond yield spreads: Subsample analyses 
Variables CSR Z-score Bond rating 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




Aggregate CSR -0.045* -0.046 -0.032* -0.009 - 0.021 0.074** 
Ownership 0.000 -0.007 0.002 0.003 -0.010 0.001 
Aggregate CSR* Ownership 0.020** -0.008 0.003 0.011*** 0.016** -0.001 
Firm size -0.239*** -0.154*** -0.246*** -0.100*** -0.233*** 0.012 
ROA -1.437*** -0.561** -0.785** -0.565** -11.641 -0.127 
Leverage -0.081 -0.161 -0.120 0.020 1.761 -0.261* 
Z-Score -1.417 -6.60*** -0.139** -0.066* -1.415 -0.046 
Interest coverage -0.001** -0.002* -0.001** -0.002 -0.012 0.002 
Issue size 0.203*** 0.032 0.097*** 0.091 0.302 -0.061 
Maturity 1.117*** 1.971*** 1.356*** 1.750*** 4.232 2.846*** 
Duration -0.147*** -0.302*** -0.183*** -0.288*** -0.758 -0.634*** 
Investment grade -0.600*** -0.475*** -0.585*** -0.443*** - - 




In sum, we use an extensive U.S. sample from 2006 to 2016 and find that CSR engagement of 
firms positively affects investors in the corporate bond market. Firms characterized by higher 
levels of corporate social performance sustain lower borrowing costs. The risk premiums 
associated with stronger CSR engagement suggests that firms regard corporate social 
responsibility as significantly value enhancing and risk reducing. CSR engagement is shown to 
reduce the risk premia associated with corporate bonds and therefore decrease the cost of corporate 
debt. These results support the risk mitigation perspective of CSR compliance showing that both 
investors and creditors may lower their expected returns because they find that CSR can mitigate 
potential business risk. Furthermore, we examine the moderating effect of managerial ownership. 
We find that when CEOs are more aligned with shareholders, firms issue bonds at a higher cost. 
Therefore, the positive effect of CSR on bond spreads is reduced when executive ownership is 
higher. Similar conclusions are drawn when we analyze the impact of CSR performance on the 
bond rating of a specific debt issue.  
V. Conclusion 
A greater amount of attention regarding improved sustainability considerations by corporations 
has been focused on equity shareholder interests and a company’s associated firm value.  Little 
research is devoted to analyzing the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
and bondholders. We focus our analysis on the corporate debt market and confirm that CSR is 
associated with the credit quality and default risk of a company. We provide empirical support for 
the informational value of CSR on bondholders in the form of higher credit ratings and lower 
Industry indicators YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of observation 520 427 524 499 750 278 
Adjusted R-squared 0.772 0.754 0.753 0.684 0.652 0.586 
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default spreads. Moreover, we find that the effect of CSR on cost of debt depends on contextual 
factors such as managerial ownership. These results support the risk mitigation perspective of CSR 
compliance. Both investors and creditors may lower their expected returns because they find that 
CSR can mitigate potential business risk. Findings can be particularly useful and significant for 
corporate decision makers, who take a personal interest in knowing what factors may impact cost 
of debt financing and to what extent, as well as bondholders who generally tend to avoid significant 
risks to ensure their fixed contractual claims on the firm’s present and future cash flows. The 
implication of the results supports the notion that how companies treat non-market stakeholders 
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VII. Appendix  
APPENDIX: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Definition Source 
Panel A. Dependent Variables   
Yield Spread  The natural logarithm of the 
difference (in basis points) between 
the corporate bond yield at issuance 
and a Treasury bond yield with 
comparable maturity.  
 
Missing values are computed as the 
difference between yields and the 
corresponding treasury yield 
having the same maturity 
(contained in the Federal Reserve 
H-15 release for constant 
maturities). 
Mergent FISD   
log(treasury_spread) 
Bond Rating The bond rating assigned by 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) to assess 
the risk quality of the bond. Bond 
ratings are converted sequentially 
to numbers with one assigned to the 
highest-rated bond (AAA) through 
25 for the lowest-rated bond (C−). 
See figure 1.2. 
 
Whenever a bond rating changes 
during the course of a given year, its 
various rating scores are averaged 
and rounded to the nearest integer. 
Mergent FISD 
 
Panel B. Independent Variables   
CSR Firm-level CSR performance 
indices constructed from multiple 
indicators within five of KLD’s 
qualitative issue areas: 
environmental issues, community 
relations, employee relations, 
diversity issues, and product safety 
and quality. We first add the scores 
of the indicators that compose each 
dimension of positive or negative 
corporate actions and scale each 
sum by dividing by the number of 
relevant indicators. 
1. Environmental CSR – the 
difference between the 
scaled strengths and 
scaled concerns of the 
environmental issue-area.  
2. Social CSR – the sum of 
the differences between 
scaled strengths and 
scaled concerns of the 
issue-areas that comprise 




the social dimension: 
community, employee, 
diversity, and product. 
3. Aggregate CSR – the sum 
of the environmental CSR 
index and the social CSR 
index. 
Managerial Ownership Fraction of the shares owned by the 
directors of a firm calculated as the 
number of the firm’s shares held by 
the CEO as a percentage of total 




Panel C. Control Variables   
Firm characteristics   
Firm Size The natural logarithm of the firm’s 
total assets. 
Compustat   
log(at) 
Profitability The ratio of the firm’s earnings 
before extraordinary items to total 
assets. 
Compustat   
ib/at 




Altman Z-score A measure of the firm’s financial 
strength. It is based on five 
financial ratios: working capital to 
total assets, retained earnings to 
total assets, earnings before interest 
and taxes to total assets, market 
value of equity to total liabilities, 





Interest Coverage  The ratio of the firm’s earnings 




Bond characteristics   
Bond Issue Size The natural logarithm of the size of 
the bond issue (in millions of 
dollars). 
Mergent FISD  
log(offering_amt) 
Bond Maturity The natural logarithm of the 
number of years until the bond 
matures. 
Mergent FISD  
lnmaturity 
Bond Duration The present value of a bond’s cash 
flows, weighted by the length of 
time to receipt and divided by the 
bond’s current market value. Bond 
duration measures the bond’s 
interest rate risk. 
Mergent FISD 
modified_duration 
Investment Grade Indicator An indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the credit rating for the 
bond issue is from (AAA=1) to 
(BBB-=10), and 0 otherwise. 






































• Beneficial Products & 
Services (env_str_a) 
• Pollution Prevention 
(env_str_b) 
• Recycling (env_str_c) 
• Clean Energy 
(env_str_d) 
• Management Systems 
Strength (env_str_g) 






• Charitable Giving 
(com_str_a) 











• Union Relations 
(emp_str_a) 





• Health & Safety 
(emp_str_g) 







• Board of Directors 
(div_str_c) 
• Family Benefits 
(div_str_d) 
• Women & Minority 
Contracting 
(div_str_e) 






• Quality (pro_str_a) 
• R&D innovation 
(pro_str_b) 










• Regulatory Problems 
(env_con_b) 
• Substantial Emissions 
(env_con_d) 
• Climate Change 
(env_con_f) 






• Negative Economic 
Impact (com_con_b) 






• Union Relations 
(emp_con_a) 
• Health & Safety 
(emp_con_b) 
• Supply Chain 
Controversies 
(emp_con_f) 



















• Antitrust (pro_con_e) 






Figure 1.2. Bond-level Credit Rating Scale 
Following a similar methodology as proposed by Becker and Milbourn (2011), we convert bond-level letter 
credit ratings to numerical ratings. This figure describes the credit rating categories and the corresponding 
numerical scale used to construct the bond credit rating dependent variable. Multiple numerical values for a 
single rating level represent the number assigned to ratings with a + qualifier, no qualifier, and a 
− qualifier. Bond-level credit ratings used in this study are extracted from Mergent FISD database. 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) Ratings Scale 







AAA Extremely strong 1 
AA+, AA, AA− Very strong  2,3,4 
A+, A, A− Strong 5,6,7 
BBB+, BBB, BBB− Adequate 8,9,10 
Non-Investment Grade BB+, BB, BB− Faces major future 
uncertainties 
11,12,13 
B+, B, B− Faces major uncertainties 14,15,16 
CCC+, CCC, CCC− Currently vulnerable 17,18,19 
CC+, CC, CC− Currently highly 
vulnerable 
20,21,22 
C+, C, C− Has filed bankruptcy 
petition 
23,24,25 

















CHAPTER 2: DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE 
ROLE OF CEO INCENTIVES AND CHARACTERISTICS 
I. Introduction 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is the efforts corporations make above and beyond the 
minimum requirements of legislation to balance the needs of stakeholders with the need to make 
a profit. Many firms are emphasizing the importance of their social performance or environmental 
practices as the concept has gained greater recognition among firm managers, investors, and 
scholars alike. CSR activity may signal a firm’s underlying corporate character and can be used to 
inform stakeholders about the moral tone of a firm’s decision-making. Firms that are proactively 
responsible in their interactions with society and the environment and that strive to balance the 
interests of their stakeholders as they pursue profit maximization may have a sustainable long-
term competitive advantage that would limit their exposure to various business-related risks that 
can have detrimental effects on firm shareholder value, revenue, or operational, capital, and 
regulatory effectiveness.  
Nowadays, corporations are expected to dedicate resources to socially responsible activities, 
such as energy conservation, climate change, human rights, employee relations, and support for 
diversity in the workplace. Organizations that promote and prioritize corporate social 
responsibility can reap the benefits of their good deeds in various ways. Studies show that CSR 
can play a significant role in enhancing firm value (Malik, 2015). Corporations can use CSR to 
reduce various operational risks that can impact profitability and overall firm sustainability 
(Waddock and Graves, 1997). Firms can also use CSR to increase employee morale, improve job 
satisfaction, and boost employee productivity (Lee et al., 2013). Socially responsible behavior can 
have a profound impact on a company’s reputation, which reflects stakeholder groups’ perceptions 
of how well the corporation’s CSR initiatives are implemented to meet stakeholder expectations. 
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By adopting a stakeholder perspective, firms can potentially maximize shareholder value in the 
future.  
For decades, there has been significant debate in the corporate finance literature on whether 
shareholders should be given priority over other important corporate constituencies (Friedman, 
1970; Freeman, 1984). The shareholder perspective suggests that the only responsibility of 
managers is to use corporate resources to maximize shareholder wealth by pursuing profits 
(Friedman, 1970). Waddock and Graves (1997) argue that socially responsible behavior weakens 
short-term performance in pursuit of potentially higher long-term value. For instance, if a company 
contributes to the environment and invests in pollution-controlling equipment, it is obligated to 
pay the costs of this equipment immediately, which may reduce its short-term profits but at the 
same time reduce its probability of litigation in the future.  Jensen (2002) argues that a firm cannot 
maximize long-term market value if it neglects the interests of its stakeholders. CSR activities 
geared to the long-term benefits of stakeholders may increase the level of trust between 
organizations and their stakeholders (Hosmer, 1994; Pivato et al., 2008; Lopatta et al., 2016), 
thereby enhancing firm value. Organizations that build strong relationships with their stakeholders 
that are built on trust, respect, and cooperation are more likely to meet their corporate business 
objectives. 
Many corporations such as Google, Toms, and Lego have demonstrated good corporate 
citizenship while developing and maintaining legitimacy. Toms has made generous charitable 
donations that support physical and mental health as well as educational opportunities. Lego has 
invested millions of dollars in environmentally conscious efforts to address issues related to 
climate change and reduced waste. Google has also demonstrated its commitment to the 
environment by investing in renewable energy sources and sustainable offices. In addition to 
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environmental concerns, Sundar Pichai, CEO of Google, has focused on issues pertaining to the 
social dimension of CSR like discrimination in the workplace. Other prominent corporations 
known for their active role in CSR include Johnson & Johnson, Coca-Cola, Ford Motor Company, 
and Starbucks. 
Lantos (2001) classifies CSR into three distinct categories: ethical, altruistic, and strategic. 
Ethical CSR consists of the legal and ethical issues required by a firm. Failure to address these 
issues can result in reputation risk or legal prosecution. Altruistic CSR exceeds the basic CSR 
requirements that a company must adhere to. It tends to have an indirect benefit to the company. 
Firms that employ this type of CSR voluntarily devote time, money, and energy towards 
addressing certain stakeholder concerns, even if committing these valuable resources sacrifices 
part of their profitability. Strategic CSR is carefully planned to have a direct and anticipated impact 
on the company. Werther and Chandler (2005) define strategic CSR as “the incorporation of a 
holistic CSR perspective within a firm’s strategic planning and core operations so that the firm is 
managed in the interest of a broad set of stakeholders to achieve maximum economic and social 
value over the medium to long term.”  
Corporate managers may choose to invest in corporate social responsibility programs for 
various reasons. For one, consumers, especially younger generations, are demanding corporate 
responsibility. According to research by Cone Communications (2017), nearly 90% of consumers 
surveyed claim that they would purchase a product because a company supports an issue they care 
about, while 76% of those surveyed declared that they would refuse to purchase a company’s 
products or services granted that the company supports an issue that contradicts their beliefs. 
Managers that genuinely believe that they have a moral responsibility towards society may also 
implement socially responsible initiatives since they are perceived to have an ethical motivation 
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(Graafland, 2013). Other corporations may have an economic motivation to promote the firm’s 
financial interests, or they may pursue CSR activities to enhance the organization’s reputation. 
Despite the motive behind integrating CSR initiatives into a firm’s business model, most CEOs 
acknowledge the significance of being socially responsible as the market rewards such behavior 
(Margolis and Walsh, 2001; Orlitzky et al., 2003). 
Extensive research has been undertaken in the area of corporate sustainability within various 
business disciplines, not confined to finance. The majority of finance-related research analyzes the 
relationship between corporate social responsibility and financial performance (Coombs and 
Gilley, 2005). Relatively few studies devote attention to exploring whether corporations act in 
socially responsible ways and to whether certain factors lead them to behave in such ways. Most 
papers that do examine these factors address the determinants influencing the extent of CSR 
disclosure as opposed to the factors influencing CSR engagement. We extend the literature and 
investigate the factors that motive firms to invest in CSR by examining various firm characteristics 
and CEO characteristics. Using a comprehensive sample of publicly traded, non-financial, U.S. 
domiciled firms for the period between 2006-2016, we find that advertising intensive firms and 
financially stable firms are more likely to engage in socially responsible activities, while risker 
firms demonstrate lower levels of CSR. We also find evidence that female CEOs are more 
intrinsically motivated to undertake long-term investments in socially responsible initiatives 
pertaining to environmental concerns and diversity issues and that the CEO compensation structure 
is more related to the employee relations and environmental concerns dimensions. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to disaggregate the CSR measure into 
two indices that address internally-related CSR issues, or issues that directly pertain to the 
employees of the organization, and externally-related CSR issues, or issues that are external to the 
35 
 
firm that deal with the community and environment. We also assess the role of CEO incentives 
from a monetary and non-monetary perspective. Non-monetary incentives are those related to CEO 
personal attributes. Monetary incentives are concerned with CEO compensation structure.  We 
postulate that non-monetary personal attributes such as age, gender, and tenure impact the CEO’s 
decisions regarding corporate social responsibility, and therefore reinforce the effect of monetary 
incentives.  
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we briefly review the literature on management’s role 
in corporate social responsibility and develop our hypotheses. We then describe the data, 
methodology, and empirical model used to test the hypotheses. We then present the results of the 
analysis; and finally, we conclude.  
II. Related literature and hypotheses development 
A. Firm characteristics 
The extant literature suggests that a firm’s financial strength is indicative of its level of 
engagement in socially responsible corporate behavior (Margolis and Walsh, 2001; Orlitzky et al., 
2003). According to slack resource theory, less profitable corporations have fewer resources to 
make use of for socially responsible initiatives than more profitable firms (Waddock and Graves, 
1997). This implies that less financially stable firms are less inclined to engage in social initiatives 
that would increase their costs and put them in a situation of risking shareholder value. Campbell 
(2007) argues that the level of competition in the market also impacts a firm’s propensity to 
participate in corporate social behavior. He claims that, under extreme competition, financially 
distressed firms with narrow profit margins may act in socially irresponsible ways just to survive. 
In contrast, when competition is normal and firm sustainability is not at risk, firms may be less 
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likely to behave irresponsibly towards society. In this case, management becomes more concerned 
with building the company’s reputation through corporate social responsibility.  
Based on literature on the firm in relation to corporate social responsibility, we develop the 
following hypotheses: 
H1: Larger firms, profitable firms, and firms that generate higher cash have higher levels of CSR. 
H2: Capital-intensive and advertising-intensive companies are more devoted to CSR activities.  
H3: Higher-valued firms, less financially constrained firms, and firms that are less financially 
distressed are more likely to invest in CSR. 
B. CEO characteristics 
CEOs have decision-making power that allows them to make crucial corporate decisions and 
significantly influence their firm’s level of corporate social responsibility. Essentially, they bear 
responsibility for the impact of CSR on the firm. Their role is to ensure that CSR is consistent with 
the firm’s strategies and that it is financially sustainable. While it may be valuable for a firm to 
engage in socially responsible practices for various justifications, CSR is financially sustainable 
only if its benefits outweigh the costs. The traditional agency view, rooted from economist Milton 
Friedman’s (1970) well-known shareholder theory, suggests that CEOs engage in CSR for their 
own interest at the expense of shareholders. In contrast, Edward Freeman’s (1984) stakeholder 
theory argues that CEOs strategically implement corporate social responsibility in order to 
maximize long-term firm value.  
Graafland et al. (2014) argue that there is an optimal level of CSR activity if the CEO is 
strategically motivated. The structure of executive compensation can be used as an effective tool 
to encourage managers to undertake socially responsible actions (Mahoney and Thorn, 2006)). 
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Under shareholder theory, CEO incentives are intended to focus managerial attention upon short-
term economic performance to comply with shareholder objectives. Typically, executive 
compensation consists of short-term incentive pay, such as base salary and annual bonus, and long-
term incentive pay like long-term incentive payouts, restricted stock grants, restricted option 
grants, and other annual noncash compensation (See figure 2.1 in appendix). The allocation 
between these two categorical incentives, which vary substantially among CEOs, is what defines 
CEO performance interests (Jensen et al., 2004). Mahoney and Thorn (2009) report a negative 
effect of salary on CSR and a positive effect of stock options on CSR. This implies that short-term 
monetary incentives take a short-term orientation, while long-term monetary incentives take a 
long-term orientation. We can argue that equity-based compensation gives managers incentive to 
maximize long-term firm value and short-term pay aligns managerial interests with shareholder 
interest. As such, we develop the following hypotheses: 
H4: Younger CEOs, female CEOs, and CEOs with a longer tenure are associated with higher levels 
of CSR. 
H5: CEO short-term monetary incentives are negatively related to a firm’s level of CSR, while 
long-term monetary incentives are positively related to CSR performance levels. 
The objective of this paper is to investigate the conditions under which corporations are more 
likely to adopt proactive CSR initiatives. We address the question of whether executive incentives 
play a role in firms’ engagement in CSR activity. We also explore whether certain types of CEOs 
are more inclined to invest in CSR. Understanding the relation between CEO compensation and 
CSR investments can help practitioners implement appropriate compensation policies that 




The MSCI KLD database provides CSR information for more than 3,000 firms. This database 
accounts for 98 percent of the total market value of all public firms in the U.S (Barnea & Rubin, 
2010). Firms are rated based on their strengths and weaknesses in various categories including 
environmental activities, community involvement, product qualities, employee relations, and 
diversity policies. We collect CSR data on publicly traded, non-financial, U.S. domiciled firms for 
the period between 2006-2016 and merge it with executive compensation data from the 
ExecuComp database.  ExecuComp database contains top executives’ salary, bonus, and stock 
option data since 1992. In addition to the compensation data we use Compustat North America for 
firm-level variables information. 
Margolis and Walsh (2003) review the CSR literature from 1972 to 2002 and find that socially 
responsible corporate behavior is treated as the dependent variable only 15 percent of the time. 
This implies that relatively few papers examine the factors that influence CSR. In this paper, we 
deviate from most studies in the literature and treat CSR as the predicted variable in our empirical 
model. Based on the extant literature, CSR is expected to provide internal and external benefits to 
a firm (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006). Following this notion, we construct two CSR indices using 
dimensions pertaining to internal-related CSR issues and external-related CSR issues. Internal 
CSR is focused on building good relations with the employees of the company. External CSR is 
focused on building corporate reputation. A more satisfied and engaged workforce is more likely 
to enhance the organization’s financial and productive performance. Internal benefits are 
concerned with fundamental intangible resources mainly associated with the employees of the 
company. Internal benefits resulting from investments in socially responsible activities can have 
an impact on the corporate culture of a company. External benefits are concerned with the firm’s 
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community and environment. Firms that take an active role in integrating sustainable practices into 
their businesses have good social responsibility reputation and thus may enhance their relations 
with external parties. 
Next, we disentangle CEO motives into monetary and non-monetary incentives (figure 2.1). 
We follow Rekker et al. (2014) and disaggregate CEO compensation into cash-based 
compensation and equity-based compensation. CSR activities are associated with stakeholder 
interests and thus have a long-term perspective. When CEO compensation is mostly comprised of 
short-term incentives, executives have a certain financial disincentive to engage in CSR activities 
(Deckop et al., 2006) since their objective is to maximize short-term performance. Therefore, we 
postulate that a short-term focus in CEO compensation is negatively related to the firm’s level of 
CSR engagement. In contrast, an executive compensation plan that emphasizes long-term 
performance reduces the pressure on CEOs to maximize short-term performance. Hence, CEO 
compensation that is mostly comprised of long-term incentives provides motivation for CEOs to 
engage in socially responsible activities. Equity-linked compensation creates incentive to take 
actions that benefit stakeholders, which ultimately benefit shareholders in the long-run.  
Using pooled OLS estimation, we analyze the impact of firm-level and CEO-level 
characteristics on corporate social responsibly performance for U.S. firms over the period of 2006-
2016. We measure CSR using two indices consisting of internal CSR and external CSR 
dimensions. Our base model is a function of firm-level and CEO-level characteristics as well as 
industry and year indicators.  
CSR = f(firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, industry and year effects) (1) 
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where, firm characteristics include firm size, profitability, cash holdings, capital expenditures, 
advertising expenditures, Tobin’s Q, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index, and Altman z-score; CEO 
characteristics are comprised of  CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO gender, cash compensation, and 
incentive compensation.  
Considering that corporate investments in CSR vary widely among companies within the same 
industry (Borghesi et al., 2014), we control for industry effects. To reconcile any econometric 
challenges, we follow Erhemjamts et al. (2013) and cluster all standard errors at the firm level in 
order to mitigate concerns for serially correlated residuals. We also estimate robust standard errors 
to address the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity.  
IV. Results 
Table 2.1 provides the essential descriptive statistics for the key variables in our analyses. The 
average scores for our two CSR performance proxies – internal CSR and external CSR – are -
0.025 and 0.024, respectively.  These averages imply that the firms in our sample have higher 
external CSR performance scores than internal CSR performance scores. The average firm in our 
sample has total assets of approximately $18.11 billion. The average operating profit margin is 
8.6%. Cash holdings average 1.47%. Tobin’s Q, KZ index, and Z-score average 1.87, 0.94, and 
2.67 respectively. The mean level of capital expenditures is $400 million, and the median is $49.6 
million.  The mean level of advertising expenses is $178 million, and the median is $18.4 million. 
On average, 96% of CEOs in our sample are males. The average CEO is 56 years old and has held 
his position for approximately 12 years. Mean annual total compensation is about $5.63 million, 
of which $1.10 million comprises the total cash compensation component and $4.53 comprises the 




Table 2.1. Summary statistics of key variables 
     N   Mean   St.Dev   p25   Median   p75 
Firm-level variables 
 Internal CSR score 17805 -.025 .323 -.15 0 .2 
 External CSR score 17805 .024 .226 0 0 0 
 Firm size (in millions) 17801 18107.08 104000 832.8 2488.111 7913 
 Profitability 17674 .086 .108 .038 .078 .128 
 Cash holdings 17701 .147 .162 .029 .086 .209 
 Capital expenditures (in 
millions) 
17658 400.202 1557.827 12.4 49.601 197.037 
 Advertising expenditures 
(in millions) 
7966 178.446 584.652 3.9 18.394 92.3 
 Tobin's Q 17727 1.873 1.239 1.135 1.483 2.126 
 Kaplan and Zingales index 16607 .936 2.743 .358 1.016 1.648 
 Altman Z-Score 14576 2.67 2.763 1.578 2.569 3.761 
 
CEO-level variables 
 Age 17674 56.162 7.447 51 56 61 
 Tenure 16375 12.401 7.948 7 11 16 
 Gender (% CEO male) 17805 .962 .191 1 1 1 
 Salary (in thousands) 17805 821.272 412.841 560 764.328 1000 
 Bonus (in thousands) 17805 278.34 1335.235 0 0 0 
 Total compensation 17782 5629.622 7078.436 1917.764 3808.917 7067.372 
 Total cash compensation 17805 1099.611 1444.967 625.961 855.036 1120.984 
 Incentive compensation 17782 4529.574 6554.597 1125.3 2833.328 5861.827 
 
 
Table 2.2 presents a Pearson correlation matrix of the main variables included in our 
analyses. Based on the table, we have no concerns for multicollinearity. Consistent with our 
predictions, firm-level characteristics such as firm size, profitability, cash holdings, capital 
expenditures, advertising expenditures, and Tobin’s Q are all positively correlated with the internal 
CSR and external CSR measures. This implies that a company’s financial position plays a role in 
its decision to adopt socially responsible behavior.  

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3 reports regression results using the internal-CSR index as the dependent variable. 
Following Borghesi et al. (2014), we estimate robust standard errors that are clustered at the firm 
level. Based on reported results from this table, we find that the level of CSR is positively related 
to firm size, cash holdings, capital expenditures, advertising expenditures, and Tobin’s Q. This 
implies that: 1) larger firms invest more in employee-related issues within the organization, 2) 
firms that have more cash abundance invest in more internal CSR issues, 3) capital-intensive firms 
invest more in internal CSR, suggesting that manufacturing companies devote more attention to 
their employees’ well-being, 4) advertising-intensive firms devote more resources to internal-CSR 
issues, and 5) firm value is positively related to internal-CSR engagement.. Consistent with Fisman 
et al. (2005), we find a positive correlation between advertising spending and CSR ratings. 
Contrary to Borgehsi et al. (2014), we find that CEO age does not have an influence on the CEO’s 
willingness to invest in CSR. The inverse relation between CEO gender and internal CSR indicates 
that female CEOs are more willing to undertake long-term investments in socially responsible 
initiatives. Furthermore, CEO tenure has a negative effect on the level of internal-CSR investment, 
which is contrary to our expectations. As for CEO monetary incentives, our hypotheses are 
partially accepted. We find that the cash compensation component has no effect on CSR, whereas 
incentive compensation is negatively related suggesting that when CEO’s private interests are 
aligned with shareholder’s interests (i.e.,  maximizing firm value and increasing accounting 







Table 2.3. The effect of firm and CEO characteristics on internal corporate social investments 
 
In Table 2.4, we analyze the effect of firm-level and CEO-level characteristics on external 
corporate social investments related to the community and environment. Results indicate that 
larger firms invest more in technical and process-centric CSR-related issues, which are known to 
have a direct impact on a firm’s community and environment. As in Table 2.3, we find a positive 
relation between advertising expenditures and external CSR. Capital intensity, however, is found 
to have no effect on a firm’s level of external-CSR investments. Furthermore, we find a positive 
relation between firm value and external-CSR engagement. Consistent with our predictions, 
financially constrained firms and financially distressed firms devote less attention to external-CSR 
issues. As for CEO characteristics, reported results reveal that CEO age, tenure, and gender have 
no effect on a firm’s level of external-CSR investments, which go against our predictions. 
Incentive compensation has no effect, but cash compensation is negatively related to CSR 
Variables Prediction (1) (2) (3) 
DV: Internal CSR DV: Employee DV: Diversity 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient  t-value 
Firm size + 0.235 7.96*** 0.065 1.70* 0.252 12.28*** 
Profitability + 0.295 1.07 0.112 0.39 0.298 1.19 
Cash holdings + 0.076 4.08*** 0.050 2.50*** 0.064 3.51*** 
Capital expenditures + 0.050 1.92** -0.000 -0.01 0.063 2.65*** 
Advertising expenditures + 0.065 3.75*** 0.049 2.59*** 0.050 3.25*** 
Tobin's Q + 0.178 2.89*** 0.197 3.06*** 0.101 1.85* 
Kaplan and Zingales index − -0.013 -2.47*** -0.010 -1.51 -0.010 -2.22** 
Altman Z-Score + -0.004 -0.82 0.000 0.05 -0.006 -1.19 
Age − -0.001 -0.30 -0.002 -0.64 0.000 0.02 
Tenure + -0.007 -1.96** -0.001 -0.29 -0.008 -2.57*** 
Gender − -0.376 -3.20*** -0.058 -0.50 -0.433 -4.52*** 
Cash compensation − -0.060 -1.14 -0.079 -1.39 -0.026 -0.59 
Incentive compensation + -0.031 -2.21** -0.040 -2.77*** -0.014 -1.10 
Year indicators  YES       YES YES 
Industry indicators  YES       YES YES 
No. of observation  5,838       5,838 5,838 
Adjusted R-squared  0.239       0.170 0.287 
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suggesting that when CEO incentives are tied to the firm’s short-term performance, the CEO is 
less likely to invest in external-CSR, or issue pertaining to the community and environment. For 
further analyses, we disaggregate the two CSR indices and consider the effect of the factors on 
each one of the individual categories. In sum, results illustrate that the CEO compensation structure 
is more related to the employee relations and environmental concerns dimensions.  
 




The measurable payoff of CSR initiatives to organizations and their stakeholders can be reaped 
in various ways.  In today’s socially conscious environment, employees and customers tend to 
place a premium on working for and spending their money with companies that prioritize corporate 
social responsibility. This study explores the various factors that motivate mangers to make 
socially responsible investments. We identify several firm-level characteristics that may incline 
Variables Prediction (1) (2) (3) 
DV: External CSR DV: Community DV: Environment 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient  t-
value 
Firm size + 0.249 9.03*** 0.101 3.34*** 0.282 12.05*** 
Profitability + -0.146 -0.67 -0.088 -0.43 -0.141 -0.68 
Cash holdings + 0.045 2.62*** -0.001 -0.06 0.067 4.13*** 
Capital expenditures + 0.029 1.50 -0.018 -0.92 0.058 2.93*** 
Advertising expenditures + 0.049 2.96*** 0.033 1.97** 0.044 3.05*** 
Tobin's Q + 0.177 3.15*** 0.122 2.24** 0.160 3.25*** 
Kaplan and Zingales index − -0.016 -2.42*** -0.007 -1.34 -0.017 -2.86*** 
Altman Z-Score + 0.011 2.10** 0.010 2.05** 0.009 1.77* 
Age − 0.001 0.39 -0.002 -0.83 0.003 1.18 
Tenure + -0.001 -0.52 0.001 0.41 -0.003 -1.11 
Gender − -0.032 -0.46 0.010 1.33 -0.129 -1.68* 
Cash compensation − -0.089 -2.23** -0.031 -0.69 -0.104 -2.98*** 
Incentive compensation + -0.002 -0.16 0.009 0.84 -0.009 -0.93 
Year indicators  YES       YES YES 
Industry indicators  YES       YES YES 
No. of observation  5,838       5,838 5,838 
Adjusted R-squared  0.258       0.107 0.307 
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companies to engage in proactive CSR and investigate the role that CEO incentives may have on 
its level of investment. We find evidence that advertising intensive firms and financially stable 
firms are more likely to engage in socially responsible activities, while risker firms demonstrate 
lower levels of CSR. We also find that female CEOs are more intrinsically motivated to undertake 
long-term investments in socially responsible initiatives pertaining to environmental concerns and 
diversity issues and that the CEO compensation structure is more related to the employee relations 
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VII. Appendix  
 
APPENDIX A: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Definition Source 
Panel A. Dependent Variable   
CSR Firm-level CSR performance 
indices constructed from multiple 
indicators within four of KLD’s 
qualitative issue areas: 
environmental issues, community 
relations, employee relations, and 
diversity issues. we first add the 
scores of the indicators that 
compose each dimension of 
positive or negative corporate 
actions and scale each sum by 
dividing by the number of relevant 
indicators. For each dimension, we 
take the difference between scaled 
strengths and scaled concerns. 
 
1. Internal CSR – employee 
relations index plus diversity 
index 
2. External CSR – community 
relations index plus 
environmental issues index 
 
MSCI KLD STATS  
 
Firm characteristics   




Profitability The ratio of the firm’s earnings 
before interest and taxes (EBIT) to 
its total assets. 
Compustat   
ebit/at 
Cash Holdings The natural logarithm of the firm’s 
cash and short-term investments 
divided by its total assets 
Compustat 
che/at 
Capital Intensity The ratio of the firm’s capital 
expenditures to its total assets. 
Compustat  
capint = capx/at 
Advertising Intensity The ratio of the firm’s advertising 
expenses to its sales. 
Compustat  
xad/sale 
Tobin’s Q The ratio of the firm’s total market 
value to its total asset value. 
Compustat  
(at+(prcc_f* csho)-ceq)/at 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
index 
A measure of the firm’s relative 
reliance on external financing. It is 
based on five financial ratios: cash 
flow to total assets, dividends to 
total assets, cash to total assets, 
debt ratio, and Tobin’s Q ratio. 
A higher value indicates greater 
financial constraints. 
Compustat 
1.002*cf_a - 39.368*div_a - 1.315*cash_a 
+ 3.139*blev + 0.283*tobinq 
 
where, 
cf_a = (dp+ib)/at 
div_a = (dvc+dvp)/at 
cash_a = (che)/at 
blev = (dltt+dlc)/(dltt+dlc+seq) 




Altman Z-score A measure of the firm’s financial 
strength. It is based on five 
financial ratios: working capital to 
total assets, retained earnings to 
total assets, earnings before interest 
and taxes to total assets, market 
value of equity to total liabilities, 
and sales to total assets. 
A higher value indicates a lower 





CEO characteristics   
CEO age The CEOs age measured in years. ExecuComp  
age 
CEO tenure The number of years in which a 




Gender indicator An indicator variable that takes the 




Salary The base salary (cash and non-
cash) earned by the CEO during the 
fiscal year in thousands of dollars. 
ExecuComp  
salary 
Bonus The bonus (cash and non-cash) 
earned by the CEO during the fiscal 
year in thousands of dollars. 
ExecuComp  
bonus 
Total compensation The sum of salary, bonus, total 
value of restricted stocks granted, 
total value of stock options granted 
(using Black-Scholes), and long-
term incentive payouts earned by 
the CEO in thousands of dollars. 
ExecuComp  
tdc1 
Total cash compensation  The natural logarithm of the CEO’s 
base salary and bonus.  
ExecuComp  
tcc = salary+ bonus 
lntcc = log(tcc) 
 
Incentive compensation The natural logarithm of the 
difference between the CEO’s 
total compensation and total cash 
compensation, which is meant to 
capture the options and incentive 
components of total compensation 
and includes restricted stock 
grants, option grants, long-term 
incentive payouts, and other 
annual noncash compensation. 
ExecuComp 
incomp = tdc1 - tcc 









APPENDIX B: CSR issue-areas from MSCI KLD STATS database  
This table lists the specific strength and concern indicators that we use to construct the CSR indices. 
 Strengths Concerns 
Panel A: External CSR categories 
Environment • Beneficial Products & Services 
(env_str_a) 
• Pollution Prevention (env_str_b) 
• Recycling (env_str_c) 
• Clean Energy (env_str_d) 
• Management Systems Strength 
(env_str_g) 
• Other Strengths (env_str_x) 
 
• Regulatory Problems 
(env_con_b) 
• Substantial Emissions 
(env_con_d) 
• Climate Change (env_con_f) 




Community • Charitable Giving (com_str_a) 
• Innovative Giving (com_str_b) 
• Community Engagement 
(com_str_h) 
• Other Strengths(com_str_x) 
 
• Negative Economic Impact 
(com_con_b) 
• Other Concerns (com_con_x) 
 
Panel B: Internal CSR categories 
Diversity • Promotion (div_str_b) 
• Board of Directors (div_str_c) 
• Family Benefits (div_str_d) 
• Women & Minority Contracting 
(div_str_e) 
• Other Strengths (div_str_x) 
 
• Controversies (div_con_a) 
• Board Diversity (div_con_c) 
 
Employee • Union Relations (emp_str_a) 
• Cash Profit Sharing (emp_str_c) 
• Employee Involvement 
(emp_str_d) 
• Health & Safety (emp_str_g) 
• Other Strengths (emp_str_x) 
 
• Union Relations (emp_con_a) 
• Health & Safety (emp_con_b) 
• Supply Chain Controversies 
(emp_con_f) 
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